



CHAIN INCIDENT REPORT ON THE ATTACK ON NARIDON

Incident Date: 26–27 July 2026

Location: Naridon Community, Kamaru Ward, Kauru LGA, Kaduna State, Nigeria

Incident Duration: Approximately 12:00 p.m., 26 July – 2:00 a.m., 27 July 2026

1. EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

On 26–27 July 2026, the community of Naridon in Kaduna State suffered a prolonged armed attack that killed 30 people, injured at least seven, including four children, and destroyed homes and businesses. The incident exemplifies persistent security challenges in vulnerable rural communities: inadequate early warning; delayed response despite repeated alerts; limited civilian protection; and deepening distrust between affected communities and security institutions.

Community members interviewed by the Christian Awareness Initiative of Nigeria (CHAIN) identified the attackers as Fulani herdsman. Residents reported that the attackers opened fire and set property ablaze during an assault lasting from approximately noon on 26 July until 2:00 a.m. the following day. CHAIN investigators arrived on 27 July while residents were still searching nearby homes, farms, and bushes for victims. The team documented 30 recovered bodies. Seven injured victims were receiving treatment at a private clinic in Bakin Kogi. One house and four shops were reportedly burned.

Community leaders stated that nearby Nigerian Army personnel failed to intervene despite repeated calls during the attack. Troops reportedly pursued suspected attackers only after a later sighting, causing them to flee and leave behind more than 100 cattle. CHAIN observed the cattle near three Dangote trucks before soldiers detained the research team, seized its electronic devices, and held its members until approximately 9:00 p.m. The team was released after being instructed not to publish photographs from the operation.

The incident therefore raises four major concerns:

- a. The scale of civilian casualties and destruction.
- b. The reported failure of security forces to respond effectively during the prolonged attack.

- c. The subsequent identification of suspected attackers and the recovery of cattle linked to the incident, raise concerns about the possible involvement of herders from the surrounding area.
- d. The growing distrust between the affected community and security institutions, illustrated by both community hostility toward security personnel and the detention of a CHAIN research team documenting the aftermath.

2. METHODOLOGY AND LIMITATIONS

Methodology:

This report is based on a rapid field assessment conducted by CHAIN on 27 July 2026 and follow-up information from community and public sources. The team visited five principal locations: Naridon Community, a private clinic in Bakin Kogi, a nearby Nigerian Army base, the Catholic Spiritual Year Training Centre in Zambina-Bakin Kogi, and an Army checkpoint where more than 100 cattle and three Dangote trucks were observed. Researchers interviewed two survivors, community leaders, youth representatives, and other witnesses. CHAIN also documented the team's detention and the seizure of its electronic devices and gathered follow-up information concerning the cattle and a reported arrest.

Limitations:

The assessment was conducted within hours of the attack while residents were still recovering bodies and assisting casualties. CHAIN lacked access to forensic evidence and could not independently verify the attackers' identities, reconcile casualty figures with official records, or confirm reports concerning an arrest, the transfer of victims, and the movement or ownership of cattle. Some follow-up information came from social media and community sources. Security restrictions, the team's detention, and the seizure of its electronic devices also limited further interviews and the immediate review of field materials.

3. BRIEF COMMUNITY BACKGROUND

Naridon is a community in Kamaru Ward, Kauru Local Government Area of Kaduna State. The community is located within an area that has experienced recurring insecurity, including attacks on rural communities, killings, kidnapping, destruction of property and displacement. One significant incident referenced by community members was the attack on Angwan Magaji in June 2026 (which has been reported on by CHAIN), during which nine people were reportedly killed and 11 others injured.

Community members also referred to an earlier incident in which local vigilantes reportedly arrested two individuals believed to have participated in an attack. According to youth leader

Samson Bulus, the suspects were handed over to Nigerian Army personnel but were subsequently reported to have escaped from custody. The community reportedly regarded the alleged escape as evidence of serious weaknesses in the security and justice system.

4. INCIDENT SUMMARY

The Attack:

According to community testimony, the attack began at approximately 12:00 p.m. on 26 July 2026 and continued until approximately 2:00 a.m. on 27 July 2026. Community members reported that armed attackers entered the settlement and began shooting residents while setting houses and commercial premises ablaze.

Residents identified the attackers as Fulani herdsmen. CHAIN did not independently verify the ethnic or communal identity of the attackers during its rapid assessment. The reported attack duration of approximately 2 hours is particularly concerning because it suggests that civilians remained exposed to armed violence for an extended period.

Community members reported that most victims were killed inside their rooms or within family compounds. Only one person was reportedly killed on the road. According to community accounts, the person killed on the road came from a neighbouring village and was attempting to enter Naridon to assist residents when he was killed as the attackers were reportedly leaving the community. The available accounts therefore suggest that many victims were killed while inside places where they had sought safety.

A major concern arising from the investigation is the reported delay or absence of an effective security response while the attack was ongoing. Community leaders stated that they repeatedly contacted nearby Nigerian Army personnel during the attack without receiving timely assistance.

Casualties:

Upon arrival at approximately 10:00 a.m. on 27 July, the CHAIN team observed residents searching houses, bushes and surrounding farms and recovering bodies. Community members reported that 30 bodies had been recovered. The field information supplied to CHAIN contained the names of 28 deceased persons (see Appendix I). The attack also resulted in the burning of one residential house and four shops (see Appendix III).

Two families reportedly refused to release the bodies of their deceased relatives or provide their details. This accounts for the difference between the 30 bodies reportedly recovered and the 28 bodies subsequently identified and conveyed to the mortuary.

At approximately 8:30 a.m. on 27 July, the CHAIN team met seven injured victims receiving treatment at a private clinic in Bakin Kogi (see Appendix II). The presence of several injured children underscores the indiscriminate and severe nature of the violence.

The emotional condition of survivors observed by CHAIN was severe. The testimony and visible distress of survivors such as Lidiya Joshua, who reportedly lost six close family members, demonstrates the need for immediate psychosocial support. Children who survived the attack may also require specialized trauma support, particularly those who witnessed killings or lost parents and caregivers.

5. NIGERIAN GOVERNMENT RESPONSE

Reported Military Pursuit of Suspected Attackers:

CHAIN was told by community leader Raphael Joshua that some of the suspected attackers had been sighted after the attack by members of the neighbouring communities. Community members reportedly notified Nigerian Army personnel, who subsequently went in pursuit of them.

Following the information received, the CHAIN team travelled approximately 18 kilometres to a Nigerian Army base to seek clarification. Upon reaching the Army base, the team attempted to obtain information from the officers regarding the reported pursuit. The officers declined to provide information concerning the operation.

CHAIN subsequently gathered from community sources that the Army had indeed responded after receiving information that suspected attackers had been sighted. According to the information provided to CHAIN, when the suspected attackers saw the approaching Army vehicles they fled, leaving their cattle behind. The Nigerian Army reportedly recovered the cattle and transported them to its base. (This account remains subject to confirmation through official military records.)

The attack has significantly damaged relations between the community and security institutions. The reported failure to respond during the attack, followed by the later appearance of security personnel, has created anger among residents.

Reported Arrest by Operation Enduring Peace:

CHAIN also subsequently found a Facebook post by Kaduna Political Affairs, which is a public, non-government account, claiming that troops of Sector 7 under Operation Enduring Peace had arrested a Fulani youth leader in connection with the Naridon attack. Operation Enduring Peace (OEP) is a Nigerian military security operation established to counter armed violence,

protect communities, maintain peace, and restore stability in areas within its operational jurisdiction. The post includes a photograph and details of the arrest.

Because this information was obtained through a public social media post rather than directly from the military, it should be treated as reported information pending official confirmation. (The relevant photograph and link will be attached to the final version of this report as an appendix.) If confirmed, the arrest would constitute an important development in efforts to establish accountability for the attack.

Community Testimony on Security Response:

Rev. Yakubu Dabo told the CHAIN team that he repeatedly contacted military leaders during the attack. He stated that he personally called more than seven times, but no assistance was sent. He further explained that the community had previously attempted to maintain a positive relationship with security agencies.

According to him, community members had recently visited both Police and Nigerian Army bases with their children and relatives living in the diaspora and donated computer systems and motorcycle tyres to encourage the security agencies to protect the community. He alleged that despite this relationship, repeated calls for assistance during the Naridon attack received no response. These allegations require verification against security communication and operational records.

Youth leader Samson Bulus told CHAIN that during a previous attack, local vigilantes arrested two persons believed to have participated in the attack. According to Bulus, the suspects were handed over to Nigerian Army personnel. He stated that when community members returned to the Army base the following day, the suspects were no longer there.

According to his account, the explanation given by military personnel was that one of the suspects had requested permission to urinate and was allowed to leave, after which he escaped. CHAIN could not independently verify this allegation. However, the account is relevant to understanding the community's perception of the security system and the strong distrust expressed by residents following the Naridon attack.

Police Officer's Account of Lacking Security Capacity:

A two-star police officer who requested anonymity, also spoke with the research team. The officer stated that he had not been deployed to Naridon but came to the area after hearing about the incident. He expressed concern about inadequate weaponry and ammunition available to security officers. According to him, officers are sometimes issued approximately 10–15 rounds of ammunition, which he argued is insufficient for prolonged engagement.

Cattle Recovery:

While returning from the Zambina-Bakin Kogi area, the CHAIN team observed three Dangote trucks parked along the road near a primary school before a Nigerian Army checkpoint. A large number of cattle were observed within the school field. The CHAIN team estimated that the number of cattle to be more than 100.

The team slowed down briefly to photograph the cattle before continuing its journey. According to information later gathered by CHAIN from community sources, the cattle reportedly belonged to the suspected attackers who had fled when the Nigerian Army pursued them. The same sources stated that the Nigerian Army subsequently transported the cattle and loaded them onto the Dangote trucks observed by the CHAIN team. Community leaders understood that the cattle would be taken to the Nigerian Army base in Kafanchan for investigation.

Detention of the CHAIN Research Team:

The team's movement through the area resulted in an additional incident requiring documentation. Before the team reached the Nigerian Army checkpoint, an Army officer rode past the CHAIN vehicle on a motorcycle. When the team reached the checkpoint, Nigerian Army personnel stopped the vehicle.

The Team Lead, Jubal Freeman Dabo, was detained, while the other CHAIN team members were left standing by the checkpoint on the road. The electronic devices of the research team were seized. The team was held for several hours, until approximately 9:00 p.m.

During the detention, the team was informed that the commander in charge would arrive to address the matter and that the team might potentially be transferred to Kafanchan for further interrogation. When the commander arrived, he remembered that Jubal had reported on the mass burial of the attack on the Angwan Magaji community. The commander subsequently requested that the CHAIN team not publish on social media the photographs taken during the observation of the cattle and related activities, and ordered the release of the team.

6. CONCLUSIONS

The Naridon attack was a grave incident involving the killing and injury of large numbers of civilians, including children, and the destruction of homes and businesses. The duration of the attack and allegations that security personnel located nearby did not respond despite repeated calls require urgent investigation.

The subsequent report that suspected attackers were located and pursued by the Nigerian Army suggests that security agencies were eventually able to mobilize after receiving actionable intelligence. However, this raises an important question concerning why an effective response was reportedly not mounted while the community was under attack. The later discovery of abandoned cattle and the reported arrest of a suspected individual represent potentially important leads for accountability.

At the same time, the detention of the CHAIN research team while documenting the aftermath raises concerns about the operating environment for civil-society organizations conducting independent human-rights documentation. The central challenge emerging from the incident is therefore not simply the occurrence of another attack, but instead the apparent breakdown of the entire civilian protection chain. Failures at any stage increase the likelihood of repeated violence and deepen community distrust.

7. PRIORITIZED RECOMMENDATIONS

Priority 1: Independent Investigation of the Attack and Security Response

The Federal Government and Kaduna State Government should establish an independent investigation into:

- a. The identity and organization of the attackers.
- b. The chronology of the attack.
- c. The number and identity of victims.
- d. The security units within operational distance of Naridon.
- e. The number of calls made by community leaders during the attack.
- f. The time at which security agencies became aware of the attack.
- g. The reasons for the reported absence or delay of intervention.
- h. The subsequent pursuit of suspected attackers.
- i. The recovery and custody of the cattle.
- j. The reported arrest of the Fulani youth leader.
- k. The treatment of victims after their transfer to Kaduna.

The investigation should produce a written report. It should not be limited to identifying perpetrators, and should establish whether institutional failures contributed to the scale of casualties.

Priority 2: Prompt Accountability for Perpetrators

The reported arrest under Operation Enduring Peace should be followed by a transparent investigation. If the arrested individual is found to have participated in, facilitated or organized the attack, prosecution should follow in accordance with Nigerian law.

The investigation should also establish whether the attack was organized by a larger network. Any evidence recovered from the cattle, weapons, communication devices or other materials associated with the suspects should be properly documented and preserved.

Priority 3: Establish a Rapid-Response Mechanism for Naridon and Surrounding Communities

A dedicated rapid-response arrangement should be established for Naridon and neighbouring vulnerable communities. This should include:

- a. A 24-hour emergency contact.
- b. A clearly identified responsible security unit.
- c. Regular patrols.
- d. Emergency communication equipment.
- e. Defined response protocols.
- f. Community early-warning structures.
- g. Regular meetings between community leaders and security commanders.

The objective should be to ensure that another attack cannot continue for hours without intervention.

Priority 4: Investigate and Document the Recovered Cattle

The cattle reportedly abandoned by fleeing suspects should be properly documented.

Authorities should establish:

- a. The number of cattle recovered.
- b. Their ownership.
- c. Their origin.
- d. Whether any animals can be connected to the suspected attackers.
- e. The identity of persons claiming ownership.
- f. Whether the cattle were used to facilitate or conceal the movement of attackers.

The process should be transparent to prevent the cattle from becoming another source of conflict.

Priority 5: Protect the Independence and Safety of Human-Rights Researchers

The detention of the CHAIN research team should be formally documented and reviewed.

Civil-society organizations conducting legitimate documentation of attacks should be allowed to carry out their work without intimidation or unnecessary interference.

At the same time, researchers should respect legitimate operational security restrictions. Where sensitive security information is involved, clear protocols should exist for responsible handling of photographs and other evidence.

The appropriate approach should be cooperation rather than confrontation between security institutions and human-rights documentation organizations.

Priority 6: Immediate Medical and Psychosocial Support

Government and humanitarian partners should urgently provide:

- a. Continued medical treatment for injured victims.
- b. Psychosocial counseling.
- c. Child-protection services.
- d. Support for bereaved families.
- e. Emergency food and household assistance.
- f. Livelihood support.
- g. Reconstruction assistance for destroyed properties.

Priority 7: Proper Documentation and Identification of All Victims

A final victims register should be established through collaboration among:

- a. Community leaders.
- b. Families.
- c. Hospital/mortuary authorities.
- d. Religious leaders.
- e. Local government authorities.
- f. Security agencies.
- g. CHAIN and other credible civil-society organizations.

The register should reconcile the reported 30 bodies recovered, 28 bodies conveyed to the Zango mortuary, and two bodies reportedly retained by families.

8. OVERALL ASSESSMENT

The Naridon incident should be understood not as an isolated violent event, but as part of a continuing pattern of insecurity affecting communities in the Kauru area. The most urgent concern is the apparent gap between early warning and effective civilian protection. Community members reported that they sought help while the attack was ongoing, yet the attack reportedly continued for several hours.

The later pursuit of suspected attackers demonstrates that security forces were capable of mobilizing once information concerning their location became available. The reported recovery of cattle and subsequent arrest of a suspected individual may provide important leads for identifying the perpetrators and networks behind the attack.

However, the incident also demonstrates the fragility of trust between affected communities and security agencies. The community's refusal to release two bodies, the angry reaction to the Army vehicle, and the detention of the CHAIN research team all point to a deeply strained relationship.

A credible response therefore requires more than humanitarian assistance. It requires protection, investigation, accountability, victim support, restoration of trust, and sustained engagement with affected communities.

APPENDIXES

APPENDIX I: DECEASED VICTIM REGISTER

The named deceased persons were:

S/NO	NAME	RELIGION
1.	Geoffrey Monday	Christian
2.	Maria Pius	Christian
3.	Ladi Monday	Christian
4.	Tabawa Monday	Christian
5.	Guntu Balla	Christian
6.	Enock Balla	Christian
7.	Markus Gashi	Christian
8.	Mariyamu Joseph	Christian
9.	Maria Istifanus	Christian
10.	Nuhu Bulus	Christian
11.	Bulus Markus	Christian
12.	Ayalla Markus	Christian
13.	Monday Danladi	Christian
14.	Kaka Umaru	Christian

15.	Gundumi Umaru	Christian
16.	Joy Ali	Christian
17.	Dominion Danladi	Christian
18.	Danladi Ibrahim	Christian
19.	Mama Ibrahim	Christian
20.	Deborah Emmanuel	Christian
21.	Friday Emmanuel	Christian
22.	Yusuf Emmanuel	Christian
23.	Yunana Emmanuel	Christian
24.	Irimiya Emmanuel	Christian
25.	Pheobe Markus	Christian
26.	Saviour Monday	Christian
27.	Audi Musa	Christian
28.	Sunday Yakubu	Christian

Researcher note: Community members reported that children, including children estimated to be approximately three to five years old, were among those killed.

Thirty bodies were reportedly recovered. Twenty-eight were subsequently conveyed to the mortuary in Zango. Two families reportedly refused to release the bodies of their deceased relatives and declined to provide details.

APPENDIX II: INJURED VICTIM LIST

NAME	AGE	RELIGION
Deborah Danladi	53	Christian
Sandra Monday	10	Christian
James Emmanuel	8	Christian
Raphael Danladi	13	Christian
Ezekiel Audu	15	Christian

Comfort Monday	43	Christian
Success Monday	13	Christian

APPENDIX III: AFFECTED PROPERTIES

The affected property owners were identified as:

NAME	PROPERTY AFFECTY BURNT	AGE	RELIGION
Mr Hosea Garba	House	45	Christian
Mr Emmanuel Garba	Shop	40	Christian
Mr Luka Ahmadu	Shop	42	Christian
Mr Monday Markus	Shop	38	Christian
Mr Dogo Rana	Shop	45	Christian

Mr. Emmanuel Garba reportedly lost five children and three other members of his family, while another child was injured.

APPENDIX IV: PERSONS INTERVIEWED / SOURCES

NAME	CATEGORY	RELEVANT INFO
Rev. Yakubu Dabo	Religious/community leader	Security response and emergency calls
Samson Bulus	Youth leader	Previous attacks and alleged escape of suspects
Raphael Joshua	Community leader	Information concerning sighting of suspected attackers

Anonymous	Police officer,	Security capacity and ammunition concerns
Lidiya Joshua	Elderly survivor/family member	Family losses and humanitarian impact
Community members	Multiple	Casualties, attack sequence and aftermath
Local vigilantes	Community security actors	Recovery and security presence

APPEDIX V: INCIDENT CHRONOLOGY

DATE/TIME	EVENT
26 July, ~12:00 p.m.	Attack reportedly begins in Naridon.
26 July	Attackers reportedly shoot residents and burn houses and shops.
26–27 July	Community members seek refuge and attempt to escape.
27 July, ~2:00 a.m.	Attack reportedly ends.
27 July, ~8:30 a.m.	CHAIN arrives at Bakin Kogi private clinic and documents seven injured victims.
~10:00 a.m.	CHAIN arrives in Naridon; police and local vigilantes observed.
Morning	Community members recover bodies from houses, bushes and farms.
~3:30 p.m.	CHAIN supports Rev. Fr. Mark Bissan and community leaders to convey 28 bodies to Zango mortuary.
3:30pm	Community leader Raphael Joshua reports that suspected attackers had been sighted and security personnel notified.

4:00pm	CHAIN travels approximately 18 km to Nigerian Army base seeking information.
4:45	CHAIN visits Catholic Spiritual Year Training Centre in Zambina-Bakin Kogi.
5:20pm	CHAIN observes three Dangote trucks and a large number of cattle near a primary school before an Army checkpoint.
5:20pm	CHAIN stopped at Army checkpoint; Team Lead detained and research devices seized.
~9:00 p.m.	Army commander arrives; Team Lead questioned; team subsequently released.
Subsequent days	CHAIN gathers information that victims were transferred to Kaduna.
Subsequent days	Social-media report attributed to Kaduna Political Affairs alleges arrest of a Fulani youth leader by troops of Sector 7 under Operation Enduring Peace.

APENDIX VI: INCIDENT PHOGRAPHS

All photographs are on the google drive in the link:

https://drive.google.com/drive/folders/1Xx9DQniDRgkrwtKu_1LLiAqXuvufnGPF?usp=sharing
details of the photographs are as follows:

Evidence No.	Date	Location	Description	Source
P-001	27 July 2026	Naridon	Affected community	CHAIN
P-002	27 July 2026	Naridon	Burnt residential property	CHAIN
P-003	27 July 2026	Naridon	Burnt shop	CHAIN
P-004 A-F	27 July 2026	Bakin Kogi	Injured victims/medical facility	CHAIN

P-005A-B	27 July 2026	Naridon	Child Killed	CHAIN
P-006	27 July 2026	Zango	Mortuary/body transportation	CHAIN
P-007 & 7B	27 July 2026	Near Army checkpoint	Cattle observed in school field	CHAIN
P-008	27 July 2026	Near Army checkpoint	Dangote trucks	CHAIN
P-009	9 August 2026	Online	Reported arrest of suspect	Kaduna Political Affairs

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